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RECENT DECISIONS 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PRoCEss-NoTICE REQUIRED To VALIDATE 
TAX FoREcLosURE OF PROPERTY OF KNowN MENTAL INCOMPETENT- On 
May 8, 1952, the town of Somers instituted an action to foreclose a number 
of tax liens. One of these was upon the property owned by a person known 
in the community to be a mental incompetent, but who had not yet been 
so certified by a court. Notice was given to the incompetent taxpayer in 
compliance with the statute1 by mail, posting, and publication. When 
she failed to answer within the prescribed period, foreclosure was entered 
and a deed to her property delivered to the town. Five days later she was 
declared a person of unsound mind, and was subsequently committed 
to a state hospital for the insane. After efforts by her committee to pay 
the taxes and recover the property failed, a motion was filed in the county 
court where the judgment of foreclosure had been entered. Petitioner 
sought an order to show cause why the default should not be opened, the_ 
judgment vacated and the deed set aside, and permission granted to 
answer with respect to the notice of foreclosure. The trial court, the 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, and the New York Court of Ap-
peals all upheld the foreclosure proceeding, the latter certifying that on 
this record there was no denial of any constitutional right.2 On appe~l 
to the Supreme Court of the United States, held, reversed and remanded. 
Under the circumstances the foreclosure amounted to a taking without 
due process since the notice given the taxpayer was inadequate. Justice 
Frankfurter dissented on the ground that the New York court's refusal 
to grant relief could be construed as an indication that the petitioner 
had selected an inappropriate remedy. Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 
U.S. 141 (1956). 
Among the procedural rights long recognized as part of the due process, 
without which a state may not deprive any person of his property, is that 
of notice and opportunity to be heard.3 In the area of civil actions in rem, 
where no personal judgment can be had against a defendant, this require-
ment of notice has always been more easily fulfilled than in actions in 
personam.4 Even before the decision in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank 
and Trust Co.5 courts phrased the minimum constitutional requirement in 
159 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1954) §165-b. 
2 TOWll of Somers v. Covey, 283 App. Div. 883, 129 N.Y.S. (2d) 537 (1954), affd. 308 
N.Y. 798, 125 N.E. (2d) 862 (1955), noted probable jurisdiction, 350 U.S. 882 (1955), revd. 
351 U.S. 141 (1956). 
3 Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316 (1890); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &: Trust Co., 
339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
4 Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry. &: Improvement Co., 130 U.S. 559 (1889); Arndt v. Griggs, 
note 3 supra. For a collection of early opinions see annotation 50 L.R.A. 577 at 597 (1901). 
There is language suggesting that the notice requirement is something above arbitrary 
classifications such as "in rem" and "in personam" in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank 
and Trust Co., note 3 supra, at 312. 
lS Note 3 supra. 
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terms of reasonableness. 8 Due process standards were derived with a view 
to established forms and procedures, some of which could hardly be said 
to have been calculated to apprise defendants of the pendency of actions 
involving their property. 7 One of these procedures, notice by publication 
to known beneficiaries of common trust funds, was discredited by the 
Mullane case. But the broad general test there formulated, viz., that 
notice had henceforth to be "reasonably calculated, under all the circum-
stances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action • • .,"8 
was so hedged about that it could not be ascertained how extensively the 
test would be applied to abrogate other traditional procedures.0 That 
the impact of the Mullane decision was slow to reach the area of tax fore-
closure is not surprising. Of all actions subject to the notice requirement to 
satisfy the guarantee of due process, the action to establish and fore-
close a lien on real property for nonpayment of taxes has almost cer-
tainly received the most liberal treatment.10 Notice and a hearing are 
clearly necessary to fix a tax based on evaluation as a charge upon property,11 
but it is not at all clear that any notice beyond that imparted by the stat-
ute and tax lists is necessary to foreclose a tax lien for nonpayment.11 
Practical considerations dictate that whatever procedure is approved should 
apply to the property of infants and incompetents with equal force. This 
has been the case in the past,13 and will probably continue to be true in 
the future. However, where a known incompetent is deliberately left with-
out the assistance of a committee until the period for redemption has lapsed, 
a special situation is presented. The brief opinion of the Court made it 
clear that the violation of due process in the principal case lay in the 
6 Arndt v. Griggs, note 3 supra, at 326; I JUDGMENTS REsTATEMENT §32, comment f 
(1942). See 50 MICH. L. REv. 124 (1951). 
'l For the early cases on this point see annotation 50 L.R.A. 577 at 597 (1901); Ownbey 
v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 at 110 (1921); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank 8: Trust Co., 
note 3 supra, at 316. 
8 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., note 3 supra, at 314. 
9 "Personal service has not in all circumstances been regarded as indispensable to the 
process due to residents, and it has more often been held unnecessary as to nonresidents. 
We disturb none of the established rules on these subjects." 339 U.S. 306 at 314 (1950). 
See 50 MICH. L. REv. 124 (1951); 39 IowA L. REv. 665 (1954) for some disturbances caused 
by the Mullane case. For conflicting interpretations, see Estate of Pierce, 245 Iowa 22, 60 
N.W. (2d) 894 (1953); Tilley, "The Mullane Case: New Notice Requirements," 30 MICH. 
ST. B. J. 12 Gan. 1951). 
10 Leigh v. Green, 193 U.S. 79 (1904); Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 
232 (1890); 160 A.L.R. 1026 (1946); 145 A.L.R. 597 (1943). 
11 Ricardo v. Ambrose, (3d Cir. 1954) 211 F. (2d) 212; Bowie v. Town of West Jeffer-
son, 231 N.C. 408, 57 S.E. (2d) 369 (1950). For the possible effects of Mullane on this, 
see Wisconsin Electric Power Co. v. Milwaukee, 263 Wis. 111, 56 N.W. (2d) 784 (1953). 
12 Ne,1ark v. Yeske!, 5 N.J. 313, 74 A. (2d) 883 (1950); Foggs v. Crutcher, 216 Ark. 
438, 226 S.W. (2d) 48 (1950). See 160 A.L.R. 1026 (1946). But see Opinions of the 
Justices, 139 Me. 420, 38 A. (2d) 561 (1943). 
13 Upholding constructive notice on the insane (1) by statute: Levy v. Newman, 
130 N.Y. 11, 28 N.E. 660 (1891); (2) by publication: Spitcaufsky v. Hatten, 353 Mo. 94, 
182 S.W. (2d) 86 (1944); (3) by mail: Devitt v. Milwaukee, 261 Wis. 276, 52 N.W. (2d) 
872 (1952). But see Lissner v. State Mtg. Corp., (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) 29 S.W. (2d) 849. 
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fact that, under the circumstances, compliance with the statutory pro-
cedures did not furnish adequate notice.u In prior cases the refusal 
to disclose a condition of incompetency to the court so that the helpless 
party may be protected has been held to be extrinsic fraud justifying' 
the setting aside of the judgment.15 Also, judgments procured against 
persons incompetent at the time of service or subsequently may be set 
aside if the original trial was not a fair adversary proceeding and a de-
fense can be shown.16 The defect in such judgments, however, has been 
felt to be equitable and not constitutional. As a result of the present 
decision it would appear that when a party is known to be incompetent 
and without a committee, even the best means of service may fall short of 
due process requirements. If the Mullane test were to be applied generally 
to actions to foreclose tax liens, publication and other forms of con-
structive notice so widely used in these proceedings might well be found 
insufficient "under all the circumstances, to apprise the interested 
party of the pendency of the action .... "17 Practical considerations 
would seem to point to a different result, however, for, it has been pointed 
out, the methods at the disposal of a state for realizing revenue from 
taxes must be swift and simple, and taxpayers should be held to be apprised 
of the essential details of these methods by the statutes themselves.18 
This basic consideration may carry such weight that even service by publi-
cation as to known parties,19 expressly repudiated in the Mullane case, 
might be found to comply with due process requirements in these tax 
enforcement situations. 
Frank M. Lacey, S. Ed. 
14 After quoting from Mullane the Court went on: "Notice to a person known to 
be an incompetent who is without the protection of a guardian does not measure up to 
this requirement." Principal case at 146. 
15 Olivera v. Grace, 19 Cal. (2d) 570, 122 P. (2d) 564 (1942). 
16Laney v. Dean, 258 Ala. 37, 61 S. (2d) 109 (1952); Hodges v. Phoenix Mutual 
Life Ins. Co., 171 Kan. 364, 233 P. (2d) 501 (1951); 140 A.L.R. 1336 (1942). 
17 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &: Trust Co., note 3 supra, at 314. The notice 
provisions of the New York statute declared unconstitutional in its application in the 
principal case are actually far more elaborate than most. The statute calls for posting, 
publishing and mailing to last known address, which would, absent the question of willful 
disregard of incompetency, in all likelihood satisfy the Mullane test. For some other 
typical provisions see cases cited note 19 infra. 
1s Devitt v. Milwaukee, note 13 supra; Leigh v. Green, note 10 supra. 
19 Most states use publication notice even as to known residents. Litchfield v. County 
of Marin, 130 Cal. App. (2d) 806, 280 P. (2d) 117 (1955); Murphy v. Clakamas County, 
200 Ore. 423, 264 P. (2d) 1040 (1953); State v. Simmons, 135 W. Va. 196, 64 S.E. (2d) 
503 (1951); Newark v. Yeske!, note 12 supra. 
